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I. INTRODUCTION
In a system of free private enterprise, the competitive price
system governs the majority of transactions between producers and
consumers of goods and services and those between suppliers and
consumers of factors of production such as land, labor, and capital.
This system uses the laws of supply and demand to solve the three
main economic problems: what is produced, how things are pro-
duced, and for whom they are produced. In many countries, gov-
ernments dissatisfied with the results of an unregulated market in-
tervene either directly, by providing funds or services, or by
regulating the market in order to change those results. For exam-
ple, governments may directly provide many free or low-cost ser-
vices such as medical care, subsidized education, and social secur-
ity payments for the needy.
At the same time, the government may affect the market re-
sults by changing the rules of the game. Thus, where imperfect
competition and oligopoly prevail in modern mixed economies,
governments influence the market through antitrust laws, public
utility regulation, and direct control of prices. In Latin America,
legislatures either have not enacted, or the respective governments
do not appropriately enforce, antitrust laws to limit adequately the
effects of oligopoly and imperfect competition on their economies.
A poor understanding of economics by legislators and judges pre-
vents antitrust laws from being effective. Politicians designing eco-
nomic policy are very sensitive to levels of unemployment. Conse-
quently, Latin American politicians usually reject monetary and
fiscal policies that deliberately slow down the economy and lead to
increased unemployment. Instead, they tend to oversimplify the
complex problems of stabilizing prices in mixed economies. Rather
than addressing the root cause of unstable markets, politicians re-
sort to methods that reduce the matter to direct price fixing by
public authorities.
The tradeoff between unemployment and inflation in the short
run is depicted by the well-known Phillips Curve. Unfortunately,
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however, the dramatic description of the dilemma that policymak-
ers face, illustrated by the Curve, does not explain how to arrest
inflation in a mixed economy.
How to avoid the tradeoff between inflation and unemploy-
ment is an open question in several countries. Peacetime wage and
price controls have been used extensively in Scandinavia, the
Netherlands, and in many Latin American countries, including the
Republic of Argentina, in an effort to control inflation without in-
creasing unemployment. Although in the short term these controls
sometimes have been effective, over a longer period they have
failed to withstand strong pressures in the economy for price in-
creases. The most famous advocate for price control systems, John
Kenneth Galbraith (head of the Price Section of the United States
Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply between 1941
and 1943) argues that price administration by government is im-
portant in any program to control inflation. Specifically, while fis-
cal and monetary policies should be emphasized to establish as
close an equilibrium between supply and demand as possible, price
control still will be needed to arrest the upward wage-price spiral.
However, Galbraith himself limits the utility of such controls:
[W]age and price controls are probably necessary in a state of
limited mobilization. They ought, however, to be employed
under conditions of an approximate equilibrium of demand and
supply. They are an adjunct of the monetary and fiscal measures
which maintain this equilibrium. Their specific and rather lim-
ited function is to prevent the interaction of prices and wages
where the imperative of maximized production requires full use
of current resources, particularly of labor.'
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, leading
monetarist Milton Friedman argues that the controls are inher-
ently immoral. By substituting the rule of men for the rule of law
and for voluntary cooperation in the marketplace, the controls
threaten the very foundations of a free society. By encouraging
men to spy and report on one another, by introducing controls the
public has an interest in evading, and making illegal actions that
are in the public interest, the controls undermine individual moral-
ity.2 He condemns controls harshly because during World War II,
1. J. GALBRAITH, A THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL 69 (1980).
2. Friedman, Morality & Controls: I, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at 41, Col. 3, quoted in
L. SILK, THE ECONOMISTs 82 (1976).
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when price control was nearly universal, black markets and ran-
dom rationing, favoritism, and bribery were so extensive that even
60,000 bureaucrats backed by 300,000 volunteers in the United
States were unable to cope with millions of people looking for ways
to get around wage and price controls which conflicted with their
individual sense of justice.
Notwithstanding the limitations advocated by Galbraith and
Friedman's counterargument attacking the immorality of price
controls, Argentina has relied on various wage and price controls
imposed by different administrations from time to time, since Sep-
tember 1930. Such controls have proven ineffective in combatting
the chronic inflation of 20 to 100 per cent per year that sometimes
has reached the point of hyperinflation.3 Argentine planners be-
lieve that the easiest and most effective way to abolish inflation is
to centrally control prices and wages, and to allow selective in-
creases only to the extent necessary to relieve sectoral pressures.
But perfect public administration is even less common than per-
fect markets. The infrequent and short periods of decreasing infla-
tion during a price control period show that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to implement a policy that relies almost exclusively on
price controls, regardless of the extensiveness of the central bu-
reaucracy or the severity of its sanctions."
In Argentina, not only were these controls marginally effective
in fighting inflation, but they also damaged public morality and
confidence and encouraged bribery, tax evasion, and black mar-
kets. Ultimately, the extent of controls imposed on companies lim-
ited the ability of businessmen to exercise their own independent
judgment and deterred risk taking.
II. PRESENT REGULATION IN FORCE IN ARGENTINA:
LAW No. 20.680
Argentine planners largely have ignored both Galbraith's
description of the limited usefulness of price controls as well as
Friedman's condemnation of these controls as both immoral and
ineffective. Since price controls were first imposed in the 1930s and
reinstated from time to time in laws enacted by the National Con-
gress, several decrees issued by the Executive Power, and hundreds
of implementing regulations have imposed maximum and/or mini-
3. See APPENDIX.
4. R. ALEMANN, CURso DE POLITICA ECONOMICA ARGENTINA 441 (1981).
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mum prices, profit margins, price-freezes, and "voluntary" price
agreements between the government, trade unions, and chambers
of commerce and industry. All such controls, without exception,
have proven ineffective; between 1964 and 1984 prices rose more
than 103,000,000 percent.'
A. Background
Law No. 20.680 ("the Law"), which has been in force since its
enactment on June 24 1974, sets forth the legal framework of the
price control regime."
Many consider most of the provisions of the Law as constitut-
ing an excessive and authoritarian regulation of commerce;7 and, at
different times, several attempts have been made to repeal or
amend the Law. However, thus far such attempts have not been
successful, and the Law, with the resulting price control regula-
tions, remains in force and continues to be applied by the Admin-
istration. In several cases, the National Supreme Court of Justice
has decided that those regimes used by the government to impose
ceilings on prices, such as the Law and its implementing regula-
tions, are not unconstitutional per se. These regimes are unconsti-
tutional only if they are arbitrary, unreasonable, or disproportion-
ate to the goals pursued by the regulations.'
The broad delegation of powers granted to the executive
branch and/or several of its departments and officials has been se-
riously criticized by Argentine scholars, especially when such dele-
gation affects personal freedom, relates to tax or criminal matters,
or imposes limits on rights guaranteed by the National Constitu-
tion (i.e., rights to own property, to work, to associate, to teach and
learn, to develop any legitimate industry, etc.).0 However, the Na-
5. See APPENDIX.
6. Law No. 20.680, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006 (1974). The Law and the decrees, resolu-
tions, regulations, and orders relating to the control of prices and emanating from depart-
ments of the Argentine Federal Administration or of Provincial or Municipal Administra-
tions are designated collectively herein as the "Price Control Regulations."
7. See, e.g., Goti, Aspectos Penales de La Nueva Ley de Abastecimiento (Ley 20.680),
57 E.D. 843; Padilla, Inconstitucionalidad de la Ley 20,680, 112 E.D. 901; Aguilar, Las
Normas de Precios Maximos de Bienes y Servicios, 1984-D L L 1276; and Aranovich, El
Control de Precios y la Clausura de Establecimientos, Ambito Financiero, Apr. 9, 1987, at
16.
8. Vicente Martini e Hijos S.R.L., 37 L.L. 561 (C.J.N. 1945); Casa Ideal de Los Novios,
44 L.L. 604 (C.J.N. 1946).
9. For a discussion of the constitutional validity of a delegation of powers to the execu-
tive branch by the National Congress see G. BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSTI-
19881
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tional Supreme Court of Justice upheld the extension of the regu-
latory powers vested in the executive by the Law or other statutes,
holding that the delegations are valid where the legislative policy is
clearly determined by the Congress, and the legislature cannot
foresee all the particular, different, or variable aspects related to a
specific matter such as the price control."0
B. Scope
The scope of the Law is extremely broad; it applies to all in-
dustrial and commercial enterprises, including natural persons en-
gaged in selling, producing, manufacturing, or providing commodi-
ties, goods, or services."
C. Implementing Authorities and Regulations
Powers vested in the executive branch by the Law may be del-
egated by the President to any of the officers of the executive
branch; pursuant to this allowance, the President has delegated his
powers to the Secretary of Trade,1" and the Legal Counsel of the
Secretariat of Trade may impose fines. Any other penalty requires
a resolution from the Secretariat of Trade.' 3
In accordance with these powers, the Secretary of Trade has
issued several hundred regulations which implement, supplement,
or interpret the Law. Provincial and municipal authorities also are
empowered by the Law to enact regulations and impose sanctions
in their respective jurisdictions. 14 However, the large numbers of
resolutions and orders issued pursuant to the Law, and the numer-
ous amendments issued from time to time by the Secretary of
Trade including express or tacit repeals, make it extremely difficult
TUCIONAL ARGENTINO 490 (1983); C. BIDEGAIN, CUADERNOS DEL CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITU-
CIONAL 238 (1981); R. BIELSA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 379 (1957); M. DIEz, DERECHO
ADMINISTRATIVO 429 (1963); J. GONZ ALEZ CALDER6N, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO
346 (1918); M. MARIENHOFF, TRATADO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 247, 429 (1965); H.
QUIROGA LAvI., DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 751 (1978); P. RAMELLA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL
644 (1982); B. VILLEGAS BASAVILBASO, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 189 (1954).
10. Ufito S.R.L., 304 Fallos 1900 (C.J.N. 1982); S.A. Radio Suipacha, 300 Fallos 272
(C.J.N. 1978).
11. Law No. 20.680, art. 1, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006 (1974).
12. Decree No. 3/1985, ADLA XLV-A 105 (1985).
13. Resolution No. 3/1985, ADLA XLV-A 328 (1985).
14. Law No. 20.680, arts. 3, 15, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006, 2007, 2010 (1974); Decree No.
1427/1985, art. 1, ADLA XLV-C 2080 (1985); Decree No. 2802/1976, art. 1, B.O. Nov. 24,
1976.
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to determine which regulations are in fact applicable with regard
to any given situation.
D. Powers Granted to the Executive Branch
The executive branch, including the Secretary of Trade in ac-
cordance with the power delegated to him, is empowered by the
Law, inter alia, to:
a) establish maximum and minimum prices, profit margins
and price-freezes at current or past price levels;
b) issue regulations and orders regarding the sale, marketing,
distribution, and production of goods and services;
c) order any given firm to produce, manufacture, market, or
distribute goods or render services;
d) set minimum production levels for any firm based on that
firm's average and potential output;
e) temporarily intervene in mining, agricultural, forestry, fish-
ing, transportation, or industrial companies and use all the neces-
sary assets owned by such companies to produce, market, dis-
tribute or transport goods. Such intervention: (1) can be ordered
only by an executive decree or a regulation issued by the Secretary
of Trade; (2) can be ordered for a period of no more than 180 days
(an extension of this period can be granted only by a new decree or
resolution); and (3) is subject to judicial review;15
f) require the filing of statements, reports, balance sheets, ac-
count books, and any other document related to the company's ac-
tivity with the Secretariat of Trade, and seize such documents for
a period of not more than 30 working days; and g)reduce or tempo-
rarily eliminate customs duties and grant subsidies or tax exemp-
tions if required in order to obtain a normal supply of goods and
services.' 6
15. Article 26 of the Law also authorizes the executive to take or seize foods, assets, or
commodities related to health, food, housing, clothing, education of the population, and in-
puts necessary for industry when these satisfy peoples' ordinary needs. In order to use such
a broad power the executive must declare "a state of economic emergency." Padilla has
harshly criticized these two sections of the Law. He argues that they clearly violate the
inviolability of property guaranteed by Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution and that
they contradict Law No. 21.499 which governs expropriation and temporary occupation of
private assets in cases of urgent public need. He further argues that Law No. 21.499 replaces
Law No. 20.680 as lex posterior derogat prior. See Padilla, supra note 7.
16. Law No. 20.680, art. 2, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006, 2007 (1974).
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E. Infringements
The following acts, inter alia, are considered infringements of
the Law and are therefore subject to penalties mentioned in Sec-
tion F below:
a) unjustified price increases (i.e., those price increases not re-
sulting from a proportionate increase in costs);
b) excessive profits;
c) building up stocks in excess of ordinary plant or production
requirements;
d) creation of unnecessary business structures to act as
intermediaries;
e) destruction of goods and commodities;
f) unjustified refusal to sell goods or render services;
g) reduction of normal production levels;
h) rerouting of supplies from one geographic area to other ar-
eas without cause;
i) interruption of supply after the establishment of maximum
prices or profit margins; and
j) refusal to invoice or furnish evidence of sales.1
F. Penalties
The Law provides that any person or company subject to price
control regulations who is engaged or is engaging in any acts or
practices which constitute a violation of the Law or its regulations
shall be subject, inter alia, to one or more of the following
penalties:
a) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of $14,000 (at the official
exchange rate in force on June 24, 1985).18 This amount can be
increased up to three times the amount of the profits obtained as a
result of infringements;
b) arrest for up to ninety days;
c) closure of the factory or commercial establishment for up to
ninety days;
17. Law No. 20.680, art. 4, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006, 2008 (1974).
18. Resolution No. 626/1986, ADLA XLVI-C 2804 (1986).
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d) cancellation of credit rating for financial transactions and
ineligibility for loans made by financial entities;
e) confiscation of commodities and goods;
f) removal from the Registry of Government Suppliers for up
to five years. The Government is also entitled to cancel contracts
currently in force with the infringing person or firm; and
g) imprisonment of up to 4 years where the infringement is of
a very serious nature. 9
The penalties mentioned under points a, b, c, and f above can
be doubled in the event of a second infringement by the same com-
pany or natural person.' Following three violations of the Law or
its implementing regulations, the Secretary of Trade may order a
permanent closing of the factory or commercial establishment. Ad-
ditionally, when a corporation infringes the price control regula-
tions, the Secretary of Trade and/or the relevant court can cancel
the corporation's charter and fine members of the board of direc-
tors and corporate managers who are guilty of serious negligence.
The fine shall consist of an amount not exceeding the equivalent of
U.S. $3,500, or imprisonment for up to twenty two days.
Ill. ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS
Companies subject to the Law also must comply with various
obligations pursuant to implementing regulations currently in
force. They must:
a) request express authorization from the Secretary of Trade
to sell new products, use new containers, use new methods of
presenting products or services in the market, or introduce changes
in size, weight or quality;2
b) maintain the May 11, 1987 level of sales and payment
conditions;22
c) as of September 1, 1986 stabilize prices at or below August
27, 1986 levels, with increases authorized monthly by the Secreta-
19. Law No. 20.680, art. 5, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006, 2008 (1974).
20. Law No. 20.680, art. 6, ADLA XXXIV-C 2006, 2008 (1974).
21. Resolution No. 50/1986, ADLA XLVI-B 1323 (1986); Resolution No. 228/1986, art.
16, ADLA XLVI-D 4414 (1986); and Resolution No. 100/1987, ADLA XLVII-A 396 (1987).
22. Resolution No. 238/1987, art. 4, ADLA XLVIII-B 1675 (1987).
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riat of Trade by means of a resolution or a specific notice;2"
d) file a list of prices with the Secretariat of Trade including
the authorized increase above the last price invoiced;24
e) file a sworn statement with the Secretariat of Trade report-
ing the total domestic sales over the past twelve months;2 5
f) file a detailed description of business costs, including the
cost of domestic and imported raw materials and packaging, as
well as salaries, social security contributions, public utilities,
power, fuel, interest, freight, royalties, advertising, turnover tax,
etc. with the Secretariat of Trade;26 and
g) file a copy of the approved price lists with the relevant pro-
vincial authority.2 7
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Officials from the Secretariat of Trade, the City of Buenos
Aires and each of the provinces of the Argentine Republic are em-
powered to verify prices charged and the sale and payment condi-
tions fixed by companies subject to the price control regulations.2 8
Alleged infringements give rise to an administrative proceeding
subject to due process of law requirements. As a result of these
proceedings, the accused party may be enjoined from further activ-
ities that give rise to those infringements and/or be subject to a
fine or other penalty. Parties may seek judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions where the Secretary of Trade orders closure.
However, such an order will not be suspended during the appeal
process2 9 Fines usually are paid only after being upheld by the
courts. Since the fines are not indexed to inflation, in real terms
the final amount may be considerably lower than the original fine
due to the loss of value during the appeal process.
On the other hand, legal actions challenging the price levels
and seeking summary relief against arbitrary price levels have sel-
23. Resolution No. 228/1986, art. 2, ADLA XLVI-D 4414 (1986).
24. Resolution No. 228/1986, arts. 12, 17, ADLA XLVI-D 4415-16 (1986); Resolution
No. 238/1987, art. 8, ADLA XLVIII-B 1678 (1987).
25. Resolution No. 100/1987, art. 8, ADLA XLVII-A 396 (1987).
26. Resolution No. 50/1986, ADLA XLVI-B 1323 (1986), Resolution No. 100/1987,
ADLA XLVII-A 396 (1987).
27. Resolution No. 264/1986, ADLA XLVI-D 4426 (1986), Resolution No. 388/1986,
ADLA XLVII-A 384 (1987).
28. Law No. 20.680, arts. 3 and 15, ADLA XXXIV-C 2007, 2010 (1974).
29. Law No. 20.680, art. 16, ADLA XXXIV-C 2010 (1974).
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dom met with success in the courts. Courts rarely will modify price
levels imposed by the Secretary of Trade due to the natural judi-
cial reluctance to overrule the Administration in technical matters.
Even though it may be possible to win damage claims against the
government for losses suffered due to unreasonable price controls,
the finding only would provide a late remedy. Moreover, because
companies fear the Administration's reprisals, judicial relief is not
widely sought.
V. PENALTIES USUALLY IMPOSED BY THE IMPLEMENTING
AUTHORITIES
Some companies have been punished with heavy fines or clo-
sures. For example, in 1984, a multinational automobile maker was
subject to a U.S. $1,000,000 fine. Moreover, in 1986, several super-
markets and factories were closed down for short periods (2 to 5
days).
Notwithstanding the infrequency of penalties such as take-
overs and arrests, in 1975 the Secretary of Trade, under strong
pressure from trade unions, took over a major textile mill. After
prolonged negotiations with officers from the Ministry of Economy,
however, the plant was returned and damages were awarded to its
owners.
Shortly thereafter, one of the main executives of the Argentine
subsidiary of a multinational corporation was under arrest for a
few days in 1976, accused of violating a price-freeze resolution is-
sued by the Secretary of Trade in June 1976.
Decisions of the Legal Counsel of the Secretariat of Trade and
resolutions of the Secretary of Trade that impose a penalty on a
person or company subject to the price control regulations can be
appealed to the Court of Criminal Economic Matters of the Fed-
eral District in the City of Buenos Aires, or to federal tribunals in
other jurisdictions.au Concurrent with a constitutional challenge re-
garding the validity of a provision of the price control regulations
at administrative proceedings, or before the corresponding court, it
also is possible to reserve the right to appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court of Justice. Depending on the particular circum-
stances of the case, the Supreme Court may then decide whether
or not to hear the appeal.
30. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In late 1985, Galbraith was invited to lecture at universities,
academic fora, and on television in Argentina. He summarized his
impressions about the trip in an article published in April 1986. As
Galbraith pointed out in this essay:
The deeper and more intractable causes of the inflation were
claims on the economy far in excess of the ability of the system
to supply claims by businessmen seeking higher earnings; by
trade unions seeking more wages and benefits; by the generals
protecting their turf; by numerous public industries, many
under the auspices of the military, operating at astonishing
losses; and by the civilian public services (approximately twenty
per cent of all employment in Argentina is provided by the gov-
ernment, including the military). 1
The excess of claims on the capacity of the economy has
stepped up generalized price increases and pressures from the un-
ions at a steadily accelerating rate. Although a comprehensive and
temporary price freeze may be necessary to alter expectations
about inflation, demand and supply need to be in close balance
when the controls are lifted. Galbraith stated that effective tax in-
creases and reductions of the budget claims on behalf of the public
enterprises and overseas commitments are necessary to achieve
this balance. 2
The Argentine Administration took only minor measures to
balance the budget and reduce public expenditure. Monetary and
fiscal policy did not back the generalized price control imposed on
the economy. As a result, inflationary pressures still affect the
economy, and the authorities insist on reducing inflation by means
of a legal framework which has proven ineffective, unjust, and con-
stitutionally questionable. The Argentine price control regulations
are comprehensive, rigid, and strict. In theory, they grant to the
government the power to close down a recalcitrant company and to
arrest its executives. Judicial review is, in most cases, tardy and
ineffective. While in practice such draconian measures seldom have
been used, they do remain in the lawbooks. Again, although small
and mid-sized local companies frequently flaunt the law with im-
punity, foreign controlled corporations feel more exposed due to
31. Galbraith, A Journey to Argentina, THE NEW YOaKER, Apr. 21, 1986, at 70, 74.
32. Id. at 76.
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their size and nationality and because their correct accounting
practices simplify the detection of infringements.
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APPENDIXt
CONSUMER PRICE AND WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES, 1931-1984
(Index Base 1960 = 100)
Year I Consumer Price Index Wholesale Price Index
1931 2.41 1.56
1932 2.16 1.58
1933 2.44 1.51
1934 2.16 1.72
1935 2.29 1.70
1936 2.49 1.73
1937 2.55 1.98
1938 2.54 1.86
1939 2.58 1.89
1940 2.63 2.15
1941 2.70 2.21
1942 2.86 2.78
1943 2.89 3.04
1944 2.88 3.31
1945 3.45 3.59
1946 4.06 4.16
1947 4.61 4.31
1948 5.21 4.97
1949 6.83 6.12
1950 8.58 7.37
1951 11.75 10.98
1952 16.30 14.41
1953 16.95 16.08
1954 17.58 16.58
1955 19.75 18.06
1956 22.40 22.75
1957 27.94 28.24
1958 36.76 37.03
1959 78.56 86.41
1960 100.00 100.00
1961 113.70 108.30
1962 143.50 141.10
1963 180.80 181.70
1964 220.70 229.22
1965 283.80 284.02
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1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
374.30
483.70
562.10
604.70
686.80
925.30
1,466.30
2,350.40
2,919.60
8,329.47
44,823.28
123,737.08
340,905.21
884,685.41
1,775,431.45
3,631,765.40
9,616,075.88
42,677,021.59
310,143,257.18
t Estadisticas de la Evolucion Economica de Argentina 1913-1984, EsTuDios 122-23, Afio
IX, N* 39, Julio-Septiembre 1986.
340.83
428.02
469.24
497.63
567.74
791.95
1,401.88
2,103.53
2,524.66
7,384.48
44,236.53
110,356.00
271,461.97
676,746.66
1,187,198.79
2,488,367.77
8,863,567.36
40,852,182.66
275,180,307.98
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